Doe
John
and Jane DOE, Appellants,
v.
FT.
LAUDERDALE MEDICAL CENTER MANAGEMENT, INC., Appellee.
No.
87-0494.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth
District.
March 9, 1988.
Rehearing Denied April 12, 1988.
Job applicant brought suit against medical center, for damages suffered
when employee committed sexual battery on her during job interview.
The Circuit Court, Broward County, Harry G. Hinckley, Jr., J., granted
center summary judgment. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Sharp,
W., Associate Judge, held that: (1) medical center was not liable on
theory that interviewer was managing agent of hospital, and (2) genuine
issue of material fact precluded summary judgment on other theories
of liability.
Reversed and remanded.
[1]
HOSPITALS k7
204k7
Medical center was not liable for alleged sexual battery performed upon
job applicant by nondoctor interviewer during his physical examination
of her breasts and thighs, ostensibly for insurance purposes, on theory
that interviewer was managing agent of medical center, even though interviewer
claimed to be doctor and part owner of center.
[2]
JUDGMENT k181(33)
228k181(33)
Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether medical center employer
was liable for job interviewer's examination of applicant's breasts
and thighs during interview, upon his claim he was a doctor and performing
examination for purposes of insurance, on theories of respondeat superior,
negligent supervision or retention, and breach of implied contract,
precluded summary judgment in favor of medical center, particularly
where center was aware that interviewer had impersonated doctors before.
*81 Dan Cytryn of Law Offices of Cytryn and Santana, P.A., Lauderhill,
for appellants.
Shelley H. Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Tutan, O'Hara, McCoy,
Graham & Lane, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
SHARP, W., Associate Judge.
John and Jane Doe appeal from a summary judgment which denied them any
relief in their suit for damages against the Ft. Lauderdale Medical
Center Management, Inc. Jane sought to prove that Bieber, the Center's
manager, committed a sexual battery on her when she interviewed at the
Center for a job. We reverse.
Read in a light most favorable to the Does,
[See Delaney v. Breeding's Homestead Drug Co., 93 So.2d 116 (Fla.1957);
Elmore
v. Vatrano, 485 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA Fla.1986)],
the record in this case established that Jane Doe went to the Center
in response to a newspaper ad to apply for the position of a medical
assistant. After filling out an application, Jane was then escorted
by Bieber into a medical examination room where she was interviewed.
During the interview, Bieber told her he was a part owner of the medical
center and he was one of the doctors on the staff. After concluding
the job interview, Bieber told Jane it was necessary for medical insurance
purposes for her to have a physical examination. He advised her to get
the physical done immediately so that if the Board of Directors approved,
she could start work the following Monday.
Bieber said the medical insurance company was particularly concerned
with cancer, and that he would have to check her for lumps. He then
proceeded to probe Jane's neck, arms, and breasts. After she said she
had had a recent urinary tract infection, he also felt her abdomen and
upper inner thighs.
The record also established that Bieber had in the past represented
himself as being a medical doctor. He sometimes introduced himself to
patients and others as "Dr. Bieber." He sometimes wore a white jacket,
typically worn by doctors. The Center's employees knew of these incidents.
He was once reprimanded by his supervisor for referring to himself as
a medical doctor.
The Center clearly authorized Bieber to interview job applicants for
the staff and allowed him access to a medical examination room for such
purposes. Jane was just one of three job applicants Bieber told he was
a medical doctor and from whom Bieber requested permission to do a physical
examination. A physical examination as a prerequisite to employment
is not an unusual requirement for a prospective employee in a health
or medical facility.
[1][2] The Does pled four theories of liability against the Center:
(1) the acts of Bieber were the same as the acts of the Center because
he was a managing agent; (2) respondeat superior, based on apparent
authority; (3) negligent supervision or retention of Bieber as an employee;
and (4) breach of an implied contract to safeguard Jane's welfare while
she was at the Center. We agree summary judgment was proper regarding
the first theory. However, we think there were material issues of fact
raised by this record regarding the second, third, and fourth theories
of recovery. City
of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla.1965);
Singer
v. Star, 510 So.2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987);
McArthur
Jersey Farm Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 240 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).
The fourth theory, breach of implied contract, has not yet been relied
upon by a case decided in Florida, although it has *82 been noted.
See Stone
v. William M. Eisen Co., 219 N.Y. 205, 114 N.E. 44 (N.Y.1916);
Martin
v. United Security Services, Inc., 373 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
(Erwin, J., concurring specially); Nazareth
v. Herndon Ambulance Service, Inc., 467 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Fla. 5th DCA),
rev. denied, 478 So.2d 53 (Fla.1985). We do not think this
theory should be ruled out at this stage of the case.
Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DOWNEY and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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